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Abstract
Malware constitutes a major global risk affecting millions of users each year. Standard algorithms in
detection systems perform insufficiently when dealing with malware passed through obfuscation tools. We
illustrate this studying in detail an open source metamorphic software, making use of a hybrid framework
to obtain the relevant features from binaries. We then provide an improved alternative solution based
on adversarial risk analysis which we illustrate describe with an example.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The digital era is bringing along new global threats among which cybersecurity related ones emerge as truly
worrisome, see for example the evolution of the Global Risks Map from the World Economic Forum (2017,
2018, 2019). Indeed, the operation of critical cyber infrastructures relies on components which could be
cyber attacked, both incidentally and intentionally, suffering major performance degradation, Rao et al.
(2016). A key concern is malware (an acronym for malicious software) which, according to ENISA (2019),
is among the top threats in the cybersecurity landscape. Indeed, malware (Radai, 1992) in its many forms,
including trojans, worms, viruses, spyware or adware, affect millions of hosts each year, Malwarebytes (2018).
Moreover, as reflected in Couce et al. (2019), the negative impacts of such threats may include not only purely
financial costs, but also deaths and injuries when dealing with cyber-physical systems, going through stolen
personal identifiable information or business secrets in enterprise systems.
Detection systems are important components in cybersecurity risk management frameworks, see Barrett
(2018). Anti-malware tools based on scanning file signatures used to recognise most malware until relatively
recently. However, these tools are much less effective nowadays due to the continuous changes introduced
in such software, as attackers learn how ICT systems owners advance in protection measures. Elingiusti
et al. (2018) and Ye et al. (2017) provide surveys of current methodologies for malware detection, usually
classified in three categories: static, dynamic and hybrid. Static analysis extract relevant binary information
from the software without running it; dynamic methods are carried out in separate isolated environments,
like sandboxes, to extract relevant information from the running software; hybrid methods combine both
approaches, typically allowing us to gain better information and understanding of the behaviour of the
incumbent binary file. Examples include Santos et al. (2009), who introduce a static analysis with Portable
Executable (PE) files and describe that malware detection works reasonably well based on operational codes
(OpCodes); Anderson et al. (2012) who combine both approaches through kernel analysis; and Van Nhuong
et al. (2014) who use semantic sets and N-gram bytes with a Naive Bayes (NB) classifier jointly with an
API function-based signature. Our benchmark will be O’Kane et al. (2016) as their binary dataset was
available and we could use it for comparison. They use OpCode density histograms extracted during run
time execution and classify with Support Vector Machines (SVM).
A prominent attacking strategy through malware is obfuscation which designates a group of procedures
that make a malware binary more difficult to be detected through anti-malware tools, as reflected in the
camouflage malware progression presented in Figure 1. The term stealth is used when a binary hides its
code to other programs; this method was not considered effective as antimalware tools were able to find the
benign parts of the code and detect the remaining malware portion. The next obfuscation advance was based
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on encryption, so that the code included a loop that encrypts its body. Then, attackers tried oligomorphic
malware which includes loops using predefined forms for each malware copy; however, once antimalware
tools were redesigned to search for all predefined loop combinations, malware became vulnerable again.
No Stealth
1970
Encrypted
1987
Oligomorphic
1990
Polymorphic
1990
Metamorphic
1998 / now
Figure 1: The malware camouflage progression, Rad et al. (2012)
Currently, obfuscation techniques have become very sophisticated and are based on two principles: poly and
metamorphism, You and Yim (2010). Polymorphic methods encrypt the malware body, changing its form for
each malware copy. Metamorphic methods use advanced obfuscation based on employing mutation engines
which modify the whole binary: consequently, each new malware clone has a different code sequence, size,
structure or syntactic properties making highly difficult for anti-malware tools to detect it.
A few approaches have been used to detect obfuscation attacks. Lakhotia et al. (2005) obtain stack
operations to detect obfuscated functions, but found that the stack was easy to corrupt. Rolles (2009)
proposes a circumvention method to break a virtualisation obfuscator converting the code to byte code
language; after conversion, he applies reverse engineering techniques. Kakisim et al. (2018) provide several
algorithms to detect metamorphic malware based on hidden Markov models, K-means clustering, artificial
neural networks, Bayesian networks and decision trees. Kaushal et al. (2012) count the API call frequency to
detect metamorphic malware which performs useless code insertion, register usage exchange, code reordering
through jump instructions or equivalent instruction replacement.
In this work, we propose a methodology to protect from obfuscation attacks based on Adversarial Risk
Analysis (ARA), Banks et al. (2015). Section 2 presents a framework for malware detection based on hybrid
analysis which provides our initial benchmark. Section 3 illustrates the problems entailed by metamorphic
malware rendering standard methods less effective. We then detail our ARA model to detect obfuscation
attacks over the benchmark performed. We finally provide examples and conclude with a discussion.
2 A FRAMEWORK TO PROTECT FROM MALWARE USING A HYBRID
APPROACH
The approach initially proposed to detect malware uses a combination of static and dynamic methods
and comprises five stages, Figure 2: preprocessing, feature extraction, feature management, training and
operation. It will serve as benchmark for our later developments.
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Figure 2: Malware detection framework
2.1 Preprocessing
We start with a set of binary samples to train a classifier. Each binary is labelled as malware (M) or benign
(B). If some of the binaries available are not labelled, we assess their label through a tool called VirusTotal
(VT), Chronicle (2018). VT uses 70 online anti-malware systems; we consider a binary as malware when at
least 50% of them indicate so.
2.2 Feature extraction
Feature extraction combines the procurement of static features directly from the binary and dynamic features
when executed in a controlled environment. For our hybrid approach, we use the static Assembly Language
File (ASM) features considered by Chadwick (2017) as well as the Hexadecimal dump (Hex dump) and the
Portable Executable File Header (PE Header) static features determined by Ahuja (2017), who claim to
have achieved good results in malware detection.
2.2.1 Static features
They are divided into three categories depending on the method employed to extract them:
• ASM. We convert the binaries into assembled files through objdump, GNU Binutils (2019). Then, we
extract its sections, registers, OpCodes, API calls and keywords.
• Hex dump. We transform the binaries into the hexadecimal format through hexdump, FreeBSD (2019).
We then obtain the file size, the mean, median, maximum and minimum of the binary entropy, along
with the entropy of the whole binary and the entropy variance and range.
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• PE Header, Wang et al. (2009). The standard file format allows us to extract features from the binaries
such as the size of the code and the number of sections, symbols and imports.
Table I summarises the 1068 static features extracted.
Feature extraction method Features Type Total
ASM Sections Discrete 9
ASM Registers Discrete 26
ASM Opcodes Discrete 94
ASM API calls Discrete 794
ASM Keywords Discrete 95
Hex dump Entropy Continuous 7
Hex dump File size Discrete 1
PE Header Several Discrete 42
Table I: Static features extracted
2.2.2 Dynamic features
Dynamic features are generated based on the run time behaviour of the binaries executed within a Virtual
Machine. To perform such analysis we use the Cuckoo Sandbox (2018) environment, which generates a
report from the behaviour obtained over a fixed period of time. We use a two minutes default configuration.
We obtain the reports from all the binaries selecting twelve features which we consider relevant for malware
detection including the number of mutex (used to coordinate program processes when the program has to
perform several tasks simultaneously), the number of file operations such as the files read or deleted (used
by some malware to steal or remove information to cause fraud or damage), the register operations and the
dll libraries loaded.
2.3 Feature management
In this phase, we perform feature management. We select the most suitable features for the incumbent
classifier in the problem at hand and study the data types which may be transformed into categorical,
discrete or continuous, looking for those providing best results. This may entail repeated iterations through
this step and 2.4. We then randomly split the dataset into train and test subsets, according to a division
ratio e.g. of 0.20: 80% of the set is used to train and the remaining 20% for testing purposes.
2.4 Training
At this stage, we must choose the classification algorithms to be used for malware detection. As the quantity
of data in the digital era is enormous, for instance, it is typical that threat intelligent systems have to process
hundreds of thousands of binaries per day to determine whether they are malware or not, we need classifiers
that obtain results in a reasonable time, see Ye et al. (2017) for a survey.
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In this paper, we consider as benchmark a NB classifier, (Lewis, 1998). This classifier has been used
for malware detection by Sahay and Chaudhari (2019), among many other authors. NB requires short
computational time for training compared with others and also, it is highly scalable, see Ashari et al. (2013).
We shall train the NB classifier based on maximising expected utility. A typical utility in this context is
the 0− 1 utility (1 if it classifies correctly; 0, otherwise), implicitly leading to standard classification criteria
based on detection accuracy (DA), and the false positive (FPR) and false negative (FNR) rates. However,
in a more risk analytic fashion, we could consider other utility functions, see our discussion in Section 5.2.
2.5 Operation
Once we have properly chosen the features and trained our classifier, we set up the framework into operation.
When we receive a new binary, we extract its features and process them through the classifier to decide
whether it corresponds to benign software or to malware. The operational criteria used, as in standard risk
analysis Bedford et al. (2001), is based on maximising expected utility through
c(x) = arg max
yC
∑
y
uC(yC , y)p(y|x), (1)
where c(x) is the class (malware, benign) which maximises expected utility, yC is the class to be predicted
for the binary, uC is the utility function used by the organisation and p(y|x) is the probability of the binary
belonging to class y given the features x.
2.6 Benchmark experiments
The experiments 1 reported here were performed in a distributed system with 25 nodes (16 cores, each at
2.60GHz). The hybrid framework has been implemented in Python 3.6.7 with packages such as sklearn,
numpy, pandas and joblib, and it has been tested with malware datasets from VxHeaven (2013) and Virus
Total, Chronicle (2018). Experiments refer to two different years to showcase and understand possible
deterioration over time due to novel attacking techniques. The datasets respectively consist of 2698 and
2955 malware binaries, which we merge with 542 benign binaries obtained from clean copies of MS Windows
7 and 8 from the Program Files folder.
To evaluate the framework performance initially, we create an experiment based on: building a dataset
with 542 malware binaries randomly selected, merged with 542 benign binaries; extract the features of the
binaries, as described in Section 2.2; split the obtained dataset into training and test sets; and, train the NB
1For reproducibility purposes, code is available at https://github.com/aRedondoH/MalwareDetectionCluster.git and at
https://github.com/aRedondoH/AROA.git.
5
classifier with the training set. Then, we undertake the NB based classification through the test set. This
experiment is repeated 1000 times with the VxHeaven and Virus Total sets. The results are shown in Table
II, where we include the results from O’Kane et al. (2016) for comparison.
VxHeaven Virus Total
Method DA FPR FNR DA FPR FNR
O’Kane et al. (SVM) 0.86 - 0.15 - - -
NB 0.93 0.11 0.02 0.86 0.21 0.03
Table II: Averaged detection accuracy for VxHeaven and Virus Total datasets
Our benchmark achieved 86% DA with the VxHeaven dataset. With our feature selection process, we
improve their performance by a 7% DA using NB. Note though that with the more modern Virus Total
dataset, the classifier decreases by 8% its DA (with an increment of 10% in the FPR). Recall that the time
difference between both datasets was of about five years. Over that period, programming languages have
evolved, programming styles have changed and new obfuscation tools have appeared. This could explain
such performance degradation.
3 THE IMPACT OF OBFUSCATED MALWARE
As we have seen, we may achieve reasonably good detection results through the proposed hybrid approach,
accomplishing better performance than e.g. O’Kane et al. (2016) benchmark. However, as mentioned in
Section 1, an attacker could create obfuscated malware, critically affecting the performance of detection
algorithms. This is the general issue addressed in the emergent field of Adversarial Machine Learning, see
the recent reviews in Vorobeychik et al. (2019) and Joseph et al. (2019).
To illustrate and understand this point, we shall obfuscate malware through an open source metamorphic
software obfuscation engine called metame, Ortega (2016). For a given code, this tool creates a software
clone with the same behaviour, but different structure, aimed at overcoming detection barriers. For this,
metame disassembles the binary seeking for six types of OpCodes, designated nop, xor, sub, push, pop, and
or, and performs operations with them. For instance, some xor OpCodes are replaced by sub ones. This
process modifies only static features, not dynamic ones, as metame aims at preserving the original software
behaviour. Figure 3 reflects this process, where we emphasize the six features that metame modifies.
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Figure 3: Metame feature modification
As a consequence, during the obfuscation process, the number of xor OpCodes will decrease, whereas that
of sub OpCodes would increase. Note that due to these modifications other features could be affected
indirectly. To observe such changes, we obfuscated 3000 binaries counting the instances in which each
feature was modified through obfuscation. Figure 4 shows the 20 features most modified, ranked according
to the number of times they were modified.
Figure 4: Top 20 features affected by metame ranked from most modified to least one
To further understand the obfuscation process, we applied it 100 times to a specific binary to check whether
there were features that might stop changing after a certain number of obfuscations. Figure 5a represents
the evolution of the modification percentage of the nop, push, pop and mov features after 14 obfuscations,
whereas Figure 5b illustrates that of the xor, sub, test and or features after 100 obfuscations.
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(a) Feature convergence (b) Feature divergence
Figure 5: Evolution of features after repeated obfuscations
We notice that the first features practically stop changing after 13 obfuscations. However, the features
reflected in Figure 5b keep on varying their values throughout the repeated application of the obfuscator.
To assess the impact of obfuscation on the detection process, we trained a NB classifier with non-
obfuscated VT (2018) malware mixed with benign binaries (50% malware, 50% benign) as in in Section
2.6. Then, we predicted through a test set formed by metame obfuscated VT malware mixed with benign
binaries, with results in Figure 6, where we show the detection accuracy with non-obfuscated and obfuscated
malware over 1000 experiments, with results averaged over groups of 100 experiments. Observe that the
accuracy of the classifier degrades approximately by 31% showing the potential of obfuscation methods in
fooling standard classifiers.
Figure 6: Obfuscation degrades malware detection
Given this performance degradation, we explored whether certain feature management operations may
improve results somehow robustifying algorithms. For that, as described in Section 2.3, we transformed the
data into different types trying a Bernoulli NB with binary features (expressed with 1 when the feature
is present and 0 when it is absent); a Multinomial NB with discrete features (representing the feature
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frequency in the binaries), Singh et al. (2019); and a Gaussian NB with continuous features (assuming they
are distributed according to a normal distribution), Yilmaz et al. (2019), to determine the classifier providing
better results. As shown in Figure 7, the Bernoulli NB classifier performs better because of its underlying
modelling assumptions.
Figure 7: Feature management might improve performance
After such feature transformation, we also checked for the minimum number of features needed to reach a
reasonable accuracy. This is important so as to reduce computation times in presence of very large amounts
of binaries. We performed experiments adding features one by one to the classifier to observe the accuracy
evaluation, Figure 8, based on the ranking in Figure 4 (extended to the 1068 features).
Figure 8: Performance with top 1000 features
We observe that with about 120 features, NB achieves around 80% accuracy and with around 220 features,
it reaches around 85%.
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4 ADVERSARIAL RISK ANALYSIS AGAINST OBFUSCATION ATTACKS
We have discussed how a classifier which operates under the standard maximum expected utility risk analytic
criteria in (1) may see its performance deteriorated if we do not pay attention to the presence of attackers
ready to modify the features of a malware. Thus, we need to take into account the presence of such adversaries
when making the detection decisions. The model that we shall propose to detect obfuscation attacks will
adapt the adversarial risk analysis approach in Naveiro et al. (2019). We sketch the common elements with
that framework, emphasising the differences proposed to detect malware.
We consider a classifier (C, she=”Cleo”) aiming at maximising her expected utility when classifying
binaries between benign (y=B) and malware (y=M). An adversary (A, he=”Alan”) is willing to obfuscate
binaries maximising his expected utility: he modifies the features x in malware binaries to x′ = o(x) through
obfuscation to outguess the classifier. We designate such obfuscation as ox→x′ . The problem faced by both
agents is represented in Figure 9 through a bi-agent influence diagram, Banks et al. (2015).
Predicted
type
yC
Modified
features
x′
Software
type
y
Software
Features
x
Obfuscation
o
Cls.
utility
uC
Att.
utility
uA
Figure 9: Bi-agent influence diagram for the obfuscated malware problem
Grey nodes represent issues that affect solely the obfuscator’s decisions; white ones, those that impact solely
those of the classifier; finally, striped nodes affect both agents’ decisions. Alan’s (the obfuscation attack
chosen) is represented through node o; Cleo’s decision (the classification choice) through yC . The impact of
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obfuscation over x results in the modified features x′. The agent’s utilities are shown through nodes uA and
uC , respectively. The classifier needs to determine the class y upon observing x
′, with her guess yC providing
her an utility uC(yC , y). Depending on such guess yC , the attacker would obtain his utility uA(yC , y, o).
We consider that the attacker is only interested in obfuscating malware, considering that he makes attacks
only in the operational phase. Thus, we assume that training is undertaken with non-obfuscated malware.
Therefore, the classifier may estimate the distribution (pC(y)) of malware and benign software, as well as the
distribution (pC(x|y)) of the features given the software type, in our case through NB during the training
phase.
4.1 Classifier’s problem
She deals with the problem as a game from a Bayesian perspective, Kadane and Larkey (1982), taking into
account that Alan’s obfuscation decision is random to her. For her analysis, the classifier needs: pC(y),
assessing her conviction about the label y of the binary, with pC(M) + pC(B) = 1 and pC(M), pC(B) ≥ 0;
pC(x|y), which models her beliefs about the features x of the binary, depending on whether it is benign or
malware; pC(x
′|o, x), describing her beliefs about the impact through an obfuscation attack o over a binary
with features x; uC(yC , y), models her preferences when she predicts class yC for the binary and the actual
class is y; and, pC(o|x, y), which represents her beliefs over the Attacker’s obfuscation action o given a binary
with features x and label y.
For a given binary characterised by its features x, we assume we may consider a set of reasonable
obfuscations O(x). As a consequence, for a given binary received with features x′, we may consider the
corresponding X ′ of features x that lead to x′, when the optimal binary is obfuscated. Specifically, given
a binary x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) with features xi ∈ {0, 1} we designate by I(x) the set of indices with xi = 0.
Then, the set of possible attacks over the binaries O(x) = {OH : H ⊂ I(x)} where OH represents that the
features whose index j ∈ H are converted into a 1. Similarly, given a binary x′, let J(x′) be the set of indices
with x′i = 1. Then, the set of originating binaries is X ′ = {xK : J(x′)}, where xK is such that xi = 0 if
i ∈ K, and xi = x′i, otherwise. However, to constraint the size of these sets so as to mitigate computational
bottlenecks, we introduce a maximum number of originating binaries, randomly sampled, and a maximum
number of attacks, again randomly sampled.
Then, given x′, Cleo aims at finding the class c(x′) maximising her expected utility, which based on the
developments in Naveiro et al. (2019), can be computed (rather than through (1) which would be adversary
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unaware) through
c(x′) = arg max
yC
[
uC(yC ,M)pC(M)
∑
x∈X ′
pC(ox→x′ |x,M)pC(x|M)
+ uC(yC , B)pC(B)pC(x
′|B)
]
, (2)
where pC(ox→x′ |x,M) models the probability, according to her, that the attacker adopts the obfuscation
ox→x′ when the malware has original features x.
Note that all of the required ingredients in (2) are standard risk analytic assessments, except for pC(ox→x′ |x,M)
due to its strategic component. We facilitate its estimation considering next the problem faced by the At-
tacker.
4.2 Attacker’s problem
To solve his decision making model we need, in principle: pA(x
′|o, x), which assess his beliefs about the
obfuscation attacks performed to x; uA(yC , y, o), describing his preferences when the classifier predicts the
label to be yC , the actual label is y and the attack is o; and, pA(c(x
′)|x′), which expresses his thoughts about
the classifier’s prediction when she observes the features x′ of the (obfuscated) binary. Let p = pA(c(o(x)) =
M |x′) be the probability that the attacker concedes to Cleo saying that the binary is malware, when she
observes x′. Since he will have uncertainty about it, we denote its density by fA(p|o(x)), and designate its
expectation pAo(x). Then, he seeks to maximise his expected utility through
o∗(x,M) = arg max
o
∫ [
uA(M,M, o) p+ uA(B,M, o) (1− p)
]
fA(p|o(x))dp
= arg max
o
[uA(M,M, o)− uA(B,M, o)] pAo(x) + uA(B,M, o).
However, she does not know his problem ingredients pAo(x), uA. Suppose that we model her uncertainty
about them through a random expectation PAo(x) and random utilities UA(yC , y, o). Then, the random
optimal obfuscation, when the malware features are x, will be
O∗(x,M) = arg max
o
(
UA(M,M, o)− UA(B,M, o)
)
PAo(x) + UA(B,M, o),
and we would make pC(ox→x′ |x,M) = Pr(A∗(x,M) = ox→x′). Typically, we would approximate the attack
probability pC(ox→x′ |x,M) through Monte Carlo. We focus before on assessing the elements UA and PAo (x).
In relation with UA, recall first that, without loss of generality, we may associate utility 0 with the
worst consequence and utility 1 with the best one, having the other consequences intermediate utilities, e.g.
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French and Insua (2000). In this problem, the best consequence for the attacker is that the classifier accepts
a malware as benign (he then has opportunities to pursue his business), whereas his worst consequence holds
when she stops a malware as such (he has wasted effort in a lost opportunity). The consequences related
with benign binaries are in between (and are actually irrelevant for the Attacker’s risk analysis). Therefore,
we may actually say that UA(M,M, o) ∼ δ0 and UA(B,M, o) ∼ δ1, the degenerate distributions at 0 and 1,
respectively. Then, Alan’s random optimal attack would be
O∗(x,M) = arg max
o
[(
0− 1
)
PAo(x) + 1
]
= arg max
o
[
1− PAo(x)
]
.
As far as PAo(x) is concerned, its assessment could be based on an estimate r of PrC(c(x
′) = M |x′). As a
probability, r ranges in [0, 1] and we could make PAo(x) ∼ βe(δ1, δ2), with mean δ1/(δ1 + δ2) = r and variance
(δ1δ2)/[(δ1 + δ2)
2(δ1 + δ2 + 1)] = var as perceived, from which we obtain the parameters δ1 and δ2. In order
to estimate r, given a binary with features x′, we consider all reasonable attacks leading to it. Let p1 be the
malware probability estimates of these attacks; p2, the benign probability estimates of these attacks. Then,
we estimate r through r = p1/(p1 +p2). Note that such probability estimates are available from the training
stage of the classifier.
We then use simulation with L samples from the random probabilities, and find
O∗l (x,M) = arg max
o
[
1− PA,lo(x)
]
, l = 1, .., L
estimating the required probability through
p̂C(ox→x′ |x,M) = #{O
∗
l (x,M) = ox→x′}
L
. (3)
4.3 An updated framework
The hybrid framework for malware detection proposed in Section 2 included an operational phase in which
detection was based on standard risk analytic computations as in (1). However, this is prone to be fooled
by intelligent adversaries and we need to update the framework replacing it by the adversarial risk analytic
version (2) which takes into account that the attacker might obfuscate the malware. At this point, we
would stress also the need to replace the standard 0− 1 utility model used in classification by utilities better
reflecting the severity of malware impact as illustrated in Section 5.2.
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5 EXAMPLE
We test the proposed approach using the developments in Sections 3 and 4. The dataset is divided into
training and test sets with a 0.20 division ratio. We first train a Bernoulli NB with benign and non-obfuscated
malware data. We perform 10 groups of 100 experiments averaging the results. We report the best results
achieved based on the following parameters: Monte Carlo size L = 700 in (3); variance var = 0.25 for the
βe(δ1, δ2) distribution; 300 original binaries x
′ generated leading to x
′
j and 20 attacks o(x) leading to x
′. To
reach such settings, we performed an large quantity of experiments exploring ranges for the parameters; for
instance, we tried the values L ∈ {100, 200, . . . , 1000} in combination with the other parameters, achieving
best results with L = 700.
5.1 0− 1 Utility
In the first set of experiments, we use the standard 0 − 1 utility (1 if binary is correctly classified and
0, otherwise) as presented in Table III, which leads to the standard DA classification criteria. Figure 10
represents the performance comparison of the proposed approach, which we designate Adversarial Risk
Analysis for Obfuscation Attacks (AROA), with that of NB.
Actual
y = M y = B
Predic. yC = M 1 0
yC = B 0 1
Table III: 0− 1 utility
Figure 10: AROA vs NB,
against obfuscated malware
Observe that AROA obtains higher accuracy than the best version of NB.
5.2 A non-standard utility function
We test now our AROA approach with other utilities, penalising more false negatives (a malware binary
classified as benign), with, e.g., −5, than false positives (when a benign binary is classified as malware), as
we consider those much more harmful. This utility function is reflected in Table IV and accuracy results
presented in Figure 11.
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Actual
y = M y = B
Predic. yC = M 1 0
yC = B -5 1
Table IV: Alternative utility
Figure 11: AROA vs NB,
against obfuscated malware
In this case, we again observe that AROA performs better than NB attaining bigger accuracy. More im-
portantly, we have computed the associated expected utilities based on Table IV. For this we used 4 groups
of 10 experiments whose results are shown in Figure 12 which portray the larger expected utilities obtained
with AROA vs a standard (utility sensitive) NB approach.
Figure 12: utility sensitive NB vs AROA
Again we observe that AROA clearly outperforms NB, perhaps even more markedly, in terms of attained
utility. Similar results have been attained with other utility functions.
6 DISCUSSION
Malware entails major cybersecurity risks as attackers learn to use advanced obfuscation techniques to
degrade the detection capacities of standard algorithms. We showcased the potential degradation with a
metamorphic tool used by attackers to obfuscate malware. Due to these inefficiencies, we have proposed a
novel approach based on adversarial risk analysis combined with a hybrid framework which extracts static and
dynamic features from binaries. We analysed it observing which features are relevant during the obfuscation
process and how their entailed data transformations affect NB performance. Our alternative approach based
15
on adversarial risk analytic computations improve performance suggesting potential in applications, even
more taking into account its operational speed.
There are many ways to continue this work. First, we have exemplified the approach with NB classifiers;
however many other algorithms have been used in this area as reviewed in the Introduction and they could
replace NB in our development. We have considered a two-class problem (benign, malware) but there are
other cybersecurity risk analysis problems which are multiclass (as with crime server classification) and we
could extend the framework to such context. We have also considered attacks in the operational phase, but it
could be the case that attacks take place in the training phase, and there is a need for further developments
in this area as well.
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